ine miles
from Murfreesboro', by the turnpike, and almost due Northeast of it. A
line drawn from Carthage to Woodbury would pass through Liberty, and
the latter is distant some eighteen miles from each. Carthage is a
little east of north, Woodbury a little west of south, from Liberty.
About twenty-one or two miles from Liberty, and west of south, is
Readyville--where was stationed at the time of which I write, a strong
Federal force. Readyville is ten miles from Murfreesboro', and about the
same distance northwest of Woodbury. Lebanon, twenty-six miles from
Liberty by the turnpike which runs through Alexandria, and northwest of
it, was at this time, permanently occupied by neither side, but both
Federal and Confederate troops occasionally held it. Carthage, far upon
the flank and virtually in the rear of the forces at Liberty, was
occupied by a Federal garrison, which varied in strength, as the plans
of the Federal Generals required. It could be reinforced and supplied
from Nashville by the river, upon which it is situated, and it was well
fortified.

A direct advance upon Liberty from Murfreesboro' promised nothing to the
attacking-party but a fight in which superior numbers might enable it to
dislodge the Confederates, and force them to retreat to Smithville;
thence, if pressed, to McMinnville or Sparta. If such a movement were
seconded by a cooperative one from Carthage, the effect would be only to
hasten the retreat, for the country between Carthage and Smithville is
too rugged for troops to traverse it with ease and dispatch, and they
would necessarily have to march directly to Liberty, or to a point but a
very short distance to the east of it. It may be stated generally that
the result would be the same were an advance made upon Liberty by any or
all of the routes coming in upon the front, and the enemy at Carthage
was dangerous only when the Confederates exposed their rear by an
imprudent advance. A rapid march through Woodbury upon McMinnville might
bring the enemy at any time entirely between Liberty and the army at
Tullahoma, or if he turned and marched through Mechanicsville, dash and
celerity might enable him to cut off the force at Liberty entirely.

When it is remembered that about the only point of importance outside
of Murfreesboro' and Nashville, and short of the line I have described
(with the exception of Lebanon), whether north or south of the river,
was occupied by a Federal garrison large enough t