Hartsville. Just as his column had crossed the river, and
ascended the bank, it was attacked by a portion of Woolford's regiment.
Major Steele was forced to recross the river and return, but before
doing so, beat off his first assailants. On the 23rd, Hutchinson, with
Company A, of Breckinridge's battalion, and a detail from the Second
Kentucky, in all, two hundred men, and the howitzers, attacked the enemy
encamped at Gallatin, landing on the southern side, and drove them out
of their encampment and across the river. A good many other scouts and
expeditions were made, replete with personal adventures, the details of
which have escaped my memory.

It was a very busy season, and a good many prisoners were taken; they
were brought in from some quarter every day. Our own loss was slight.
Colonel Morgan believed that, with enemies so near him, in so many
quarters, he could defend himself only by assuming the offensive.

General Bragg's army did not get to Murfreesboro' until the 20th or
21st. During that time, General Breckinridge had some four thousand
infantry. Rosecrans' army must have been concentrated in Nashville by
the 12th. Two days' marching would have brought them to Murfreesboro'.
General Breckinridge could not have repulsed it; of course it could have
been subsisted for a week off of the country, or its foragers had lost
their cunning. In that time General Bragg would have been forced, in all
probability, to return to East Tennessee, without a chance to deliver
battle with a rational hope of success. His army was footsore, weary,
and could not have been readily concentrated. Buell was removed because
he was thought to be "slow," and dull to perceive and seize favorable
opportunities. There will always be a difference of opinion about which
opportunities were the safest to seize. A very prevalent opinion
obtained in "Morgan's cavalry" (who thought that they appreciated
Buell), that had he been in command at Nashville, on the 12th of
November, 1862, he would have marched without delay on Murfreesboro'. It
is not too much to claim that Morgan's destruction of the railroads
delayed, not only the concentration at Nashville, but the movement
thence to Murfreesboro'. The activity of Morgan, Forrest and the other
Confederate cavalry commanders, in November, and the firm attitude of
Breckinridge, also contributed to prevent it.

In the latter part of November, Colonels Cluke and Chenault rejoined the
brigade. Their reg