ensions.
It is probable that no other man than Colonel Morgan would have escaped
(in such a situation) death or capture. But his presence of mind and
address, in the midst of a great and imminent danger, were literally
perfect. I have known many similar escapes, where the chances were not
so desperate; but in each case but this, there was some circumstance to
intimidate, or to contribute to mystify the enemy. On this occasion
every circumstance was adverse to him. He could expect no rescue from
his friends, for we had managed so badly, that the enemy had gotten
between him and us. He was dressed in full Confederate uniform. The
enemy knew that the Confederate forces were near by, and it was
reasonable to suppose that he was attached to them. The prisoners were
there to tell on him. He had nothing to depend upon but the audacity and
address which never failed him, and a quality even higher than
courage--I can describe it only as the faculty of subjecting every one
to his will, whom he tried to influence; it was almost mesmeric. The
prisoners fifty or sixty in number, were paroled in the course of the
day and started back to Kentucky by a route which would enable them to
avoid meeting detachments of their own army. Our party encamped that
night about seven miles from Gallatin. Colonel Morgan when he started
upon this expedition, knew that Wood's and Van Cleve's divisions were
marching toward Gallatin, and he cautioned Hutchinson not to make a
fight, if during his absence the enemy approached the town,
simultaneously, upon more than two roads. He knew that Hutchinson would
be vigilant, but he feared that his indisposition to avoid fighting
would induce him to engage a larger force of the enemy than he could
repulse. Early in the morning of the day succeeding that on which the
events I have just described occurred, the enemy marched into Gallatin.
They had threatened the place on three sides during the night, but
Hutchinson hoping to repulse them, would not retire.
In the morning, however, they demonstrated in such strength, as to
convince him that he had better not fight--and so, sending the brigade
on the Lebanon road to cross the Cumberland, he retained only the
advance-guard of the Second Kentucky, and the howitzers, to salute the
enemy as they entered. His guns were planted upon the eminence on the
Lebanon road, just outside of town, and, as the head of a column of
infantry turned into that road, they were opened, c
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