t, had Rome been situated on the same side of the
Mediterranean as Carthage, and had she been a seceded state, inferior
in wealth, numbers, and resources, which the latter was trying to
"coerce," Fabius would have been a most injudicious selection as
commander-in-chief. Historians are agreed, I believe, that if the advice
of this classic "Micawber," to the consuls Livius and Nero, had been
followed by them, the battle of "The Metaurus" would not have been
fought, the two sons of the "Thunder-bolt" would have effected their
junction, and would, in all probability, have forced the legions to
another and final "change of base."
This campaign demonstrated conclusively the immense importance to the
Confederacy of the possession of East Tennessee, and the strategic
advantage (especially for offenso-defensive operations) which that vast
natural fortress afforded us. While that region was firmly in the
Confederate grasp, one half of the South was safe, and the conquests of
the Federal armies of the rest were insecure. It is apparent at a glance
that so long as we held it, communication between the armies of Northern
Virginia and of Tennessee would be rapid and direct; co-operation,
therefore, between them would be secure whenever necessary. While these
two armies could thus practically be handled almost as if they were one
and the same, communication between the Federal army of the Potomac and
that of the Ohio was circuitous, dilatory, and public. No advance of the
enemy through Tennessee into Georgia or Alabama could permanently
endanger the integrity of the Confederate territory, while the flank and
rear of his army was constantly exposed to sudden attack by formidable
forces poured upon it from this citadel of the Confederacy.
Not only would the safety of invading armies be compromised, and their
communications (even if confined to the Tennessee rivers), be liable at
any time to be destroyed, but a sudden irruption from East Tennessee
might (unless an army was always ready to meet it), place the most
fertile portions of Kentucky, perhaps, even a portion of the territory
of Ohio, in the hands of the Confederates. The success clearly attending
the Confederate strategy in the first part of this campaign, would
seem, too, to establish the fact, that, until the concentration for
decisive battle becomes necessary, an army may (under certain
circumstances), be moved in two or more columns, upon lines entirely
independent of each
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