want of promptness upon the part of General Polk, no doubt would have
produced a suspension of the attack. A corps so strong and efficient,
could have been ill-spared from an army, already inferior in numbers to
the antagonist it was about to assail, and the absence of the brave old
Bishop from the field, would have been, of itself, a serious loss. This
delay was the cause of grave apprehensions to many of the Confederate
Generals, and, as matters were managed, was really unfortunate.

It was known that Buell was marching rapidly to the support of Grant,
and General Johnson wished to crush the latter before their junction was
effected.

General Beauregard was of opinion that the attack, having been so long
delayed, ought to be abandoned altogether; that it would now be
extremely hazardous, and that the safety of the army would be
compromised if it did not retire promptly to Corinth.

General Johnson listened courteously to every argument, but was moved by
none to relinquish his plan. His resolution to fight, after placing his
army in front of the enemy, was fixed. He believed, "the offensive once
assumed, ought to be maintained at all hazards." He trusted that vigor
and audacity would enable him to accomplish victory on the first day,
before the fresh troops came, and his designs were too profoundly
considered, his gallant faith in his soldiers, too earnest, for his
purpose to be shaken. In answer to an anxious inquiry from his aide,
Colonel William Preston, he said, quietly, "I would fight them were they
a million."

The ground selected for battle was that inclosed between Owl and Lick
creeks, which run nearly parallel with each other, and empty into the
Tennessee river. The flanks of the two armies rested upon these little
streams, and the front of each was just the distances, at their
respective positions, between the two creeks. The Confederate front was,
consequently, a little more than three miles long. The distance between
the creeks widens somewhat, as they approach the river, and the Federal
army had more ground upon which to deploy. The position which the enemy
occupied next morning, is five or six miles from the river, and his
advance camp was perhaps a mile southward of Shiloh Church. He had, as
yet, established no line; the attack next morning took him completely by
surprise, and he formed after the fight had commenced.

General Johnson's effective strength, including all the forces available
for that