d glory, that might
satisfy the most energetic and most daring nature.

CHAPTER VII.

On the 3rd of April, the army, leaving its cantonments around Corinth,
commenced its advance, and the heads of the columns were directed toward
Pittsburg, on the Tennessee river, where, unconscious of the gathering
storm, lay the Federal host under General Grant, which had conquered at
Donelson. Flushed with that victory and insolent with triumph, the enemy
rested for the long march of invasion which he believed would lead him
(unchecked, even if opposed) to easy, speedy and decisive conquest. No
thought of danger to himself, disturbed these pleasant anticipations.

The suggestion that an attack from the Confederate forces at Corinth was
imminent, would have been dismissed as the idlest and weakest of
apprehensions. The different corps moved from their respective
positions, on the railroads which enter Corinth, by the most direct
roads to the point indicated for their concentration.

General Johnson had declared, some weeks previously, with prophetic
judgment, that upon that very spot, "the great battle of the Southwest
would be fought."

Breckinridge's division, to which Morgan's squadron was now attached,
moved from Byrnesville. The roads were narrow and miry, and were not
improved by a heavy rain which fell during the march, and by the passage
of successive trains of wagons and batteries of artillery. The march was
slow and toilsome. The infantry labored along with mud-clogged feet,
casting sour looks and candid curses at the cavalry and couriers, who
bespattered them. The artillery often stuck fast, and the struggling
horses failed to move the pieces, until the cannoneers applied
themselves and pushed and strained at the heavy wheels.

On the 5th, about three or four in the afternoon, every thing was
concentrated upon the ground, where General Johnson proposed to
establish his line, and the disposition of the forces, in accordance
with the plan of battle, was at once commenced. On account of some
accident, or mistake, this concentration was effected one day later than
had been contemplated, causing a corresponding delay in the attack. It
has frequently been asserted that this was occasioned by the failure of
General Polk's corps to arrive at the appointed time.

General Polk's report demonstrates the injustice of this statement, and
it is probable that the condition of the roads was the sole cause of the
delay.

A