battle, was about thirty-five thousand men. That of the enemy
was, perhaps, forty-five thousand men. The advantages of attack and
surprise would, General Johnson thought, more than counterbalance his
numerical inferiority. If Buell brought reinforcements to his opponents,
by forced marches, in advance of his army, he would feel their effect
only in a stronger line, and more stubborn resistance upon the
front--his flanks would be safe in any event. The array of his forces
evinced a resolution to break through and crush, at any cost, whatever
should confront him in the narrow space where the whole conflict would
be crowded.

The troops were bivouacked that night upon the ground which it was
intended that they should occupy in line of battle. No disposition which
could be made that evening was delayed; every precaution was taken to
guard against a further procrastination of the attack. The men laid down
to sleep in the order in which they were to rush upon the enemy.

General Hardee had command of the first line, General Bragg of the
second, and General Polk of the third. General Hardee's line extended
from the one creek to the other, and as his corps (fully deployed) could
not properly occupy the entire distance, he was reinforced by a fine
brigade under Brigadier General Gladden. To Hardee was given the honor
of commencing the battle, and he was ordered to push his whole line
rapidly forward, at early dawn. General Bragg's line was formed
similarly to General Hardee's, and about a quarter of a mile in its
rear. Bragg was ordered to advance simultaneously with Hardee, and to
support him when he needed assistance. Then, at the distance of eight
hundred yards, came General Polk's corps, not deployed, but formed in
column of brigades. General Breckinridge's division (over six thousand
strong) constituted the reserve, and was close in the rear of Polk's
corps. The cavalry was promiscuously disposed--indeed, no one in
authority seemed to think it could win the battle. Morgan's squadron was
formed with the Kentucky troops, and occupied the extreme left of
Breckinridge's division. This disposition of the forces and the
energetic conduct of the Confederate commanders, explain the striking
features of the battle, which have been so often remarked--the
_methodical_ success of the Confederates, upon the first day, the
certainty with which they won their way forward against the most
determined resistance; the "clock-like" regularit