much stronger and probably more consistent here than there. My
brother writes me word that the King is most anxious to preserve
peace, and is now feeling the pulse of the country, and doing his
utmost to ascertain what the state of public opinion is, for his
own guidance in the approaching crisis. Though now acting in
apparent unison with Thiers, he would have no scruple in
resisting the course of policy in which Thiers is embarked, if he
found he could count upon the support of the country in his own
pacific views; and it is the possibility of such a contest
occurring in France which renders the question so very delicate
and difficult, and makes the issue dependent on contingencies
which no sagacity can foresee or provide for. Out of this
complication Palmerston's wonderful luck may possibly extricate
him, though it must be owned that he is playing a very desperate
game.

[12] [Dutch Minister at the Court of St. James.]

[13] Clarendon, to whom I told this, said it was not true:
he had said nothing about their support, but had said,
'I approve of your policy, but you must have no war.'

September 5th, 1840 {p.300}

[Page Head: OPPOSITION TO LORD PALMERSTON.]

I have been more in the way of hearing about the Eastern Question
during the last week than at any previous time, though my
informants and associates have been all of the anti-Palmerston
interest--Holland House, and Clarendon, Dedel (who objects to the
form more than the _fond_), and Madame de Lieven, who is all with
Guizot, because he is devoted to her, and she feels the greatest
interest where she gets the most information. Clarendon showed me
the other day a long letter which he wrote to Palmerston in March
last, in which he discussed the whole question, stating the
objections to which he thought Palmerston's policy liable, and
suggesting what _he_ would have done instead. It was a well-
written and well-reasoned document enough.

Those who are opposed to Palmerston's policy, and even some who
do not object to the policy itself so much as to the manner in
which it has been worked out, feel confident that the means will
fall very short of accomplishing the end, and that peace will be
preserved by their very impotence at a great expense of the
diplomatic reputation of the parties concerned; and they are
confirmed in this notion by the failure of some of the
anticipations in which Palmerston so confidently indulged,
especi