ne of Government together as long as
possible, by any means he could, and was content to leave the
issues of peace or war to the chapter of accidents. The rest of
the Cabinet seem to have been pretty evenly balanced, feeling (as
was very natural) that they had no good case for opposing
Palmerston, conscious that Lord John's alarms were not without
foundation, and that his position gave him a right to take a
decisive lead in the Cabinet; still they were not inclined to act
cordially and decisively with him, and hence vacillation and
uncertainty in their councils. Palmerston alone was resolute;
entrenched in a strong position, with unity and determination of
purpose, quite unscrupulous, very artful, and in possession of
the Foreign Office, and therefore able to communicate in whatever
manner and with whomsoever he pleased, and to give exactly the
turn he chose to any negotiation or communication, without the
possibility of being controlled by any of his colleagues. From
the beginning, Lord John seems never to have seen his way
clearly, or to have been able to make up his mind how to act. My
own opinion is, that if there had been a will, there might have
been found a way, to do something; but Palmerston had no such
will. On the contrary, he was resolved to defeat the intentions
of his colleagues, and he has effectually done so.

October 8th, 1840 {p.332}

[Page Head: LORD JOHN'S LAST EFFORT.]

Lord John Russell called on me yesterday morning, more to talk
the matter over than for any particular purpose. He was, as
usual, very calm about it all. I told him all I thought, and
asked him why Guizot's offer had not been made use of; when he
said that it had been considered, but for three reasons, which he
gave me, it had been judged impossible to make it the foundation
of a communication, and that Metternich's paper had been taken
instead. Two of the reasons were, 1st. That the Viceroy's offers
would probably have been already rejected at Constantinople;
2ndly. That the insurrection in Syria would have been organised,
and it might entail consequences on the Syrians that it would be
unjust to expose them to; 3rdly. The necessity of the previous
concurrence of the Allies. They all seemed to me very bad
reasons.

I told him that Palmerston had gained his point, and that the
whole thing turned upon the success of the insurrection. He
admitted that it did, and stated the grounds there were for
hoping that it would succeed.