t me as to
the future. I told him that though there was the same desire for
a reconciliation with France, and the same anxiety to assist M.
Guizot on the part of my friends, when they came to consider what
was possible and would be safe and justifiable, they were unable
to find any expedient to meet the immense practical difficulties
of the case; that events had proceeded with such celerity, and
placed the question in so different a position, that concessions
formerly contemplated as reasonable and possible were now out of
the question. They all felt that they could offer nothing in
Syria; that it was possible the Sultan might be actually in
possession of any town or territory at the moment they were
offering it, and that now justice to the people, honour and
fidelity to our allies, especially to the Sultan himself, forbade
us to make any concession whatever in that quarter. Bourqueney
did not deny the force of this, but he said Guizot was sanguine
as to the acceptance of some such terms as he had suggested, and
it was of the last importance he should be undeceived, and made
acquainted with the real truth, and know what he had to rely on.
He said he would write, but he entreated me to write to him too,
and to tell him the substance of what I had imparted to him.
Accordingly I did write to Guizot at great length, setting forth
in terms as strong as I could, and without any disguise, the
difficulties of the case, and the utter unreasonableness of the
French public in requiring, as a salve to their vanity, terms
which we could neither in good policy or good faith concede. We
both agreed that under existing circumstances it was not
desirable that Guizot should make any proposal to our Government,
and so we both of us told him. Such was the result of a
conversation which when reported to Guizot will be a bitter
disappointment to him; but I concur with the rest, that we could
not now make any of the concessions he was disposed to ask.
Bourqueney suggested that if the chances of war should be
hereafter favourable to the Pasha, if the Allies should make no
impression upon Acre or the south-west part of Syria, then
possibly some transaction on such a basis might be possible.
This, however, it was useless to discuss. Yesterday I saw Dedel,
who has lately been at Walmer, and he told me the Duke of
Wellington's opinion exactly coincided with ours, coincided both
as to the impossibility of our making any concession in Syria,
and