uld do nothing, he took the only line that was left him, and
the best after all, and threw himself on the sense and reason of
the country. He told the truth, and justified himself by
vindicating us. He has done very well, and shown himself a good
debater; but the discussion has been disgracefully personal, and
with all the talent displayed they have not an idea how a
deliberating assembly ought to conduct its debates, and the
disclosures and revelations of official secrecy and confidence
have been monstrous. Thiers has all along been playing a false,
shuffling, tricky part, and at last he got so entangled in the
meshes of his own policy, and so confused by the consequences of
his double dealing, that he evidently did not know what to do;
and the King had no difficulty in getting him out of a Government
that he could no longer conduct. He says now that he meant to
make war by and by; but though these menaces and the reasons he
gives afford Palmerston his best justification, and are appealed
to triumphantly by him and his friends, my own conviction is that
Thiers would gladly have closed the account by a transaction, and
that _at last_ he would have come into the Treaty--if Palmerston
would have let him in--upon terms much worse for the Pasha than
those to which he would not have consented before July. Nothing
that has occurred shakes my conviction that Palmerston was very
wrong not to endeavour to bring France into the Treaty and to
offer the _status quo_, though it is very possible France would
have refused it. If the French Government were on the one hand
resolved to agree to nothing, and under no circumstances to join
in coercing the Pasha, Palmerston on the other was as obstinately
determined to settle the business his own way, and not to make
any proposal to France which she would or could accept. They both
stood aloof, and both were immensely to blame. Palmerston has
taken his success without any appearance of triumph or a desire
to boast over those who doubted or opposed him; whatever may be
said or thought of his policy, it is impossible not to do justice
to the vigour of his execution. Mr. Pitt (Chatham) could not have
manifested more decision and resource. He would not hear of
delays and difficulties, sent out peremptory orders to attack
Acre, and he provided in his instructions with great care and
foresight for every contingency. There can be no doubt that it
was the capture of Acre which decided the campaign