ether it be physical or mental. To some, the thought that the
world is such an orderly thing is in the highest degree repugnant. They
object that, in such a world, there is no room for _free-will_; and they
object, further, that there is no room for the _activity of minds_. Both
of these objections I shall consider in this chapter.
But first, I must say a few words about a type of doctrine lately
insisted upon,[1] which bears some resemblance to interactionism as we
usually meet with it, and, nevertheless, tries to hold on to the doctrine
of the conservation of energy. It is this:--
The concept of energy is stretched in such a way as to make it cover
mental phenomena as well as physical. It is claimed that mental
phenomena and physical phenomena are alike "manifestations of energy,"
and that the coming into being of a consciousness is a mere
"transformation," a something to be accounted for by the disappearance
from the physical world of a certain equivalent--perhaps of some motion.
It will be noticed that this is one rather subtle way of obliterating the
distinction between mental phenomena and physical. In so far it
resembles the interactionist's doctrine.
In criticism of it we may say that he who accepts it has wandered away
from a rather widely recognized scientific hypothesis, and has
substituted for it a very doubtful speculation for which there seems to
be no whit of evidence. It is, moreover, a speculation repugnant to the
scientific mind, when its significance is grasped. Shall we assume
without evidence that, when a man wakes in the morning and enjoys a
mental life suspended or diminished during the night, his thoughts and
feelings have come into being at the expense of his body? Shall we
assume that the mass of his body has been slightly diminished, or that
motions have disappeared in a way that cannot be accounted for by a
reference to the laws of matter in motion? This seems an extraordinary
assumption, and one little in harmony with the doctrine of the eternity
of mass and the conservation of energy as commonly understood. We need
not take it seriously so long as it is quite unsupported by evidence.
46. THE ORDER OF NATURE AND "FREE-WILL."--In a world as orderly as, in
the previous section, this world is conceived to be, is there any room
for freedom? What if the man of science is right in suspecting that the
series of physical causes and effects is nowhere broken? Must we then
conclude
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