t. It
is not freedom from overpowering passion. It is freedom from all the
motives, good as well as bad, that we can conceive of as influencing man,
and freedom also from oneself.

It is well to get this quite clear. The "free-willist" maintains that,
_in so far as a man is "free,"_ his actions cannot be accounted for by a
reference to the order of causes at all--not by a reference to his
character, hereditary or acquired; not by a reference to his
surroundings. "Free" actions, in so far as they are "free," have, so to
speak, sprung into being out of the void. What follows from such a
doctrine? Listen:--

(1) It follows that, in so far as I am "free," I am not the author of
what appear to be my acts; who can be the cause of causeless actions?

(2) It follows that no amount of effort on my part can prevent the
appearance of "free" acts of the most deplorable kind. If one can
condition their appearance or non-appearance, they are not "free" acts.

(3) It follows that there is no reason to believe that there will be any
congruity between my character and my "free" acts. I may be a saint by
nature, and "freely" act like a scoundrel.

(4) It follows that I can deserve no credit for "free" acts. I am not
their author.

(5) It follows that, in so far as I am "free," it is useless to praise
me, to blame me, to punish me, to endeavor to persuade me. I must be
given over to unaccountable sainthood or to a reprobate mind, as it
happens to happen. I am quite beyond the pale of society, for my
neighbor cannot influence my "free" acts any more than I can.

(6) It follows that, in so far as I am "free," I am in something very
like a state of slavery; and yet, curiously enough, it is a slavery
without a master. In the old stories of Fate, men were represented as
puppets in the hand of a power outside themselves. Here I am a puppet in
no hand; but I am a puppet just the same, for I am the passive spectator
of what appear to be my acts. I do not do the things I seem to do. They
are done for me or in me--or, rather, they are not done, but just happen.

Such "freedom" is a wretched thing to offer to a man who longs for
freedom; for the freedom to act out his own impulses, to guide his life
according to his own ideals. It is a mere travesty on freedom, a fiction
of the philosophers, which inspires respect only so long as one has not
pierced the disguise of its respectable name. True freedom is not a
thing to be sou