t rests on wholly unproved assumptions. It is a play of
the speculative fancy, and has its source in the author's strong desire
to fit mental phenomena into some general evolutionary scheme. As he
is a parallelist, and cannot make of physical phenomena and of mental
one single series of causes and effects, he must attain his end by
making the mental series complete and independent in itself. To do
this, he is forced to make several very startling assumptions:--

(1) We have seen that there is evidence that there is consciousness
somewhere--it is revealed by certain bodies. Clifford assumes
consciousness, or rather its raw material, _mind-stuff_, to be
everywhere. For this assumption we have not a whit of evidence.

(2) To make of the stuff thus attained a satisfactory evolutionary
series, he is compelled to assume that mental phenomena are related to
each other much as physical phenomena are related to each other. This
notion he had from Spinoza, who held that, just as all that takes place
in the physical world must be accounted for by a reference to physical
causes, so all happenings in the world of ideas must be accounted for
by a reference to mental causes, _i.e._ to ideas. For this assumption
there is no more evidence than for the former.

(3) Finally, to bring the mental phenomena we are familiar with,
sensations of color, sound, touch, taste, etc., into this evolutionary
scheme, he is forced to assume that all such mental phenomena are made
up of elements which do not belong to these classes at all, of
something that "cannot even be felt." For this assumption there is as
little evidence as there is for the other two.

The fact is that the _mind-stuff_ doctrine is a castle in the air. It
is too fanciful and arbitrary to take seriously. It is much better to
come back to a more sober view of things, and to hold that there is
evidence that other minds exist, but no evidence that every material
thing is animated. If we cannot fit this into our evolutionary scheme,
perhaps it is well to reexamine our evolutionary scheme, and to see
whether some misconception may not attach to that.

[1] "Collected Essays," Vol. I, p. 219, New York, 1902.

[2] "On the Nature of Things-in-Themselves," in "Lectures and Essays,"
Vol. II.

[3] "Examination of Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy," Chapter XII.

[4] "On the Nature of Things-in-Themselves."

CHAPTER XI

OTHER PROBLEMS OF WORLD AND MIND

44. IS THE