eral law--when we show, in other words, that
it does not stand alone. But this does stand alone, and is admitted to
stand alone. We admit as much when we say that the mind is immaterial,
and yet hold that it is related to the body. We cannot, then, ask for
an _explanation_ of the relation.
But this does not mean that the reference of mental phenomena to the
body is a meaningless expression. We can point to those experiences of
concomitance that we all have, distinguish them carefully from
relations of another kind, and say: This is what the word means,
whether it be used by the plain man or by the man of science.
I have said above: "If there is a brain change of a certain kind, there
is the corresponding sensation." Perhaps the reader will feel inclined
to say here: If you can say as much as this, why can you not go a
little farther and call the brain change the _cause_ of the sensation?
But he who speaks thus, forgets what has been said above about the
uniqueness of the relation. In the objective order of our experiences,
in the external world, we can distinguish between antecedents and
consequents, between causes and their effects. The causes and their
effects belong to the one order, they stand in the same series. The
relation of the physical to the mental is, as we have seen, a different
relation. Hence, the parallelist seems justified in objecting to the
assimilation of the two. He prefers the word "concomitance," just
because it marks the difference. He does not mean to indicate that the
relation is any the less uniform or dependable when he denies that it
is causal.
38. IN WHAT SENSE MENTAL PHENOMENA HAVE A TIME AND PLACE.--We have seen
in Chapters VI and VII what space and time--real space and time--are.
They are the plan of the real external world and its changes; they are
aspects of the objective order of experience.
To this order no mental phenomenon can belong. It cannot, as we have
seen (section 35), occupy any portion of space or even have a location
in space. It is equally true that no series of mental changes can
occupy any portion of time, real time, or even fill a single moment in
the stream of time. There are many persons to whom this latter
statement will seem difficult of acceptance; but the relation of mental
phenomena to space and to time is of the same sort, and we can consider
the two together.
Psychologists speak unhesitatingly of the localization of sensations in
the
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