nsion with a real mathematical point, and call the tree nonextended
in this sense. If we do this we are still in the old error--we have
not gotten away from real space, but have substituted position in that
space for extension in that space. Nothing mental can have even a
position in real space. To do that it would have to be a real thing in
the sense indicated.

Let us, then, agree with the plain man in affirming that the mind is
nonextended, but let us avoid misconception. The mind is constituted
of experiences of the subjective order. None of these are in
space--real space. But some of them have apparent extension, and we
must not overlook all that this implies.

Now for the mind as immaterial. We need not delay long over this
point. If we mean by the mind the phenomena of the subjective order,
and by what is material the phenomena of the objective order, surely we
may and must say that the mind is immaterial. The two classes of
phenomena separate themselves out at once.

[1] "The Passions," Articles 34 and 42.

CHAPTER IX

MIND AND BODY

35. IS THE MIND IN THE BODY?--There was a time, as we have seen in the
last chapter (section 30), when it did not seem at all out of the way
to think of the mind as in the body, and very literally in the body.
He who believes the mind to be a breath, or a something composed of
material atoms, can conceive it as being in the body as unequivocally
as chairs can be in a room. Breath can be inhaled and exhaled; atoms
can be in the head, or in the chest, or the heart, or anywhere else in
the animal economy. There is nothing dubious about this sense of the
preposition "in."

But we have also seen (section 31) that, as soon as men began to
realize that the mind is not material, the question of its presence in
the body became a serious problem. If I say that a chair is in a room,
I say what is comprehensible to every one. It is assumed that it is in
a particular place in the room and is not in some other place. If,
however, I say that the chair is, as a whole, in every part of the room
at once, I seem to talk nonsense. This is what Plotinus and those who
came after him said about the mind. Are their statements any the less
nonsensical because they are talking about minds? When one speaks
about things mental, one must not take leave of good sense and utter
unmeaning phrases.

If minds are enough like material things to be in anything, they must
be in thing