m.

The English Agent then demanded, if there were no means to avoid
treating with us of the affairs of America. The Count de Vergennes
replied, by referring him to the answer given to the first overtures
of pacification made by the mediators, and communicated to Mr
Livingston.

It should be observed, that whether England treats of the affairs of
the United States with the Court of Versailles, or whether she opens a
direct communication with the United States, she cannot avoid treating
with the American negotiators sent by Congress. In either case she
will be under the necessity of acknowledging that body.

The conduct of his Majesty on this occasion being strictly conformable
to justice and his engagements, his Minister confines himself to a
simple communication of it to Mr Livingston. He confides also to him,
that the Count de Vergennes, in declaring to the English Agent, that
his Majesty could not listen to any negotiations of peace if the Court
of London did not treat at the same time with his allies, added
verbally, that the King did not attend to his own satisfaction till
that of his allies was procured.

Besides this, the effects of these steps taken by the Court of London,
have been to engage France to pursue, with redoubled vigor, the
measures that have given birth to these appearances of peace, but
which would certainly not terminate in it, if England perceived that
her enemies relaxed their efforts in any manner. It is above all
things indispensable, that the United States should, in the course of
this campaign, be in a situation to co-operate in vigorous
enterprises, which may be formed. It appears that the design of the
Court of London, pointed out by the debates in Parliament, is to
reduce, by a defensive war, their operations upon this continent. The
Minister of his Most Christian Majesty has at present no information
relative to the plans of the approaching campaign. But whatever they
may be, it would be useful to be enabled to inform his Court, that the
United States will not adopt an inactivity, which would be equivalent
to the truce required. But that their design is to trouble the repose,
that the enemy wish to deliver themselves to, and that the operations,
whether combined or separately undertaken by the United States, will
be pushed with activity during the ensuing campaign.

As to the place of the negotiations, Congress knew in 1779, when they
named a Plenipotentiary, and in 1781, when they