that you would station regular expresses to facilitate the
communication between you and him.

I ought to be well convinced of your goodness to take so much liberty,
but the object is of such importance to the common cause, that I have
no doubt of your excusing me.

If the communication between you and M. de Vaudreuil is regular and
sure, you might, I should think, correspond without cypher; if not I
must beg you to furnish M. de Vaudreuil with a cypher to make the
matter more secure, and if your Excellency will from time to time give
me the same information I shall be exceedingly obliged.

The procuring of the necessary intelligence must be attended with
extraordinary expense; I must beg that your Excellency will charge
some one to acquaint me of the sums necessary for the purpose, and to
whom I shall pay it. These expenses being wholly for the service of
our fleet, must be charged to the Department of the Marine, and I have
taken the necessary measures that they may be exactly paid.

By our last accounts from France the Duc de Lauzun, and many other
officers who had sailed, were obliged to put back, having met with a
storm. It is supposed they may have sailed again towards the last of
June.

I am, &c.

LUZERNE.

* * * * *

TO GEORGE WASHINGTON.

Translation.

Philadelphia, August 14th, 1782.

Sir,

A cartel will probably have arrived at Boston with American sailors
from England. One is arrived here with two hundred and forty sailors,
whom England has set at liberty. One of the Captains, with whom I have
conversed, tells me that a fleet of two hundred sail was to leave
Portsmouth a few days after the cartels; they were to separate into
three divisions, one for Charleston, one for New York, and one for
Quebec; they are to be convoyed by frigates only; and they assure me
the last division is the most important, having soldiers on board, and
many articles necessary for the defence of Quebec, and for the
subsistence of the inhabitants.

From the different accounts I can collect, it seems to be the design
of England to make a general peace, but the demands on one side and
the other will render a conclusion extremely difficult, and in such a
case, that power will spare nothing to effectuate a peace with the
United States, and