and, confined themselves within such bounds of moderation
as would give no umbrage to any one of the powers at war with Great
Britain.

That the King had, in different circumstances, taken the proper
measures to deprive the enemy of all hopes, which they might have
formed of introducing dissensions between his Majesty and his allies.
That it was to be wished, that the Court of London was fully convinced
of the impossibility of treating separately with America. That this
had always been the chimerical and favorite idea of England; and that
so long as it subsisted, there would perhaps be no possibility of
treating seriously about the conditions of a peace. That their
negotiations would only be an artifice to scatter divisions among the
allies, and retard their exertions for continuing the war. That the
shortest way to put a stop to their intrigues, would be to let it be
known publicly in the most explicit manner, that the United States
neither can nor will make any peace without the concurrence of their
ally; and that if England has any overtures of peace to make to them,
the American Plenipotentiaries are sufficiently empowered to receive
them, and to negotiate a peace, if those overtures are admissible.

That this peremptory language would free Congress from all the
embarrassments, which the English Ministers could throw in the way;
that it would bring them to a sincere disposition to make peace; put
an end forever to their machinations with the mediating powers;
deprive them of the means of feeding the Parliament and people of
England with the hopes of a separate peace; and finally save the
Americans from all the difficulties, which would infallibly take place
if England were allowed to negotiate in America. It would convince
England, that the United States are not less attached to their
engagements with their ally than sensible of the respect due to the
Courts of Vienna and Petersburg, whose mediation Congress have
accepted.

The Minister added, that though the situation of the belligerent
powers, the distance of America, and the slowness and difficulty of
communication made it advantageous that the seat of negotiation should
be in Europe, and that the enemy should be informed of this
resolution, yet Congress had the fullest liberty to follow the system
which France had pointed out in her answer to the mediating powers, in
consequence of which the American Ministers might negotiate
immediately and directly, confor