ever, intercepted and
captured in those waters. This disaster convinced the French government of
its helplessness at sea, and it made no further effort.

The last naval operations took place in the West Indies, where the
Spaniards, who had for a time been treated as a negligible quantity, were
attacked on the coast of Cuba by a British [v.03 p.0045] squadron under Sir
Charles Knowles. They had a naval force under Admiral Regio at Havana. Each
side was at once anxious to cover its own trade, and to intercept that of
the other. Capture was rendered particularly desirable to the British by
the fact that the Spanish homeward-bound convoy would be laden with the
bullion sent from the American mines. In the course of the movement of each
to protect its trade, the two squadrons met on the 1st of October 1748 in
the Bahama Channel. The action was indecisive when compared with the
successes of British fleets in later days, but the advantage lay with Sir
Charles Knowles. He was prevented from following it up by the speedy
receipt of the news that peace had been made in Europe by the powers, who
were all in various degrees exhausted. That it was arranged on the terms of
a mutual restoration of conquests shows that none of the combatants could
claim to have established a final superiority. The conquests of the French
in the Bay of Bengal, and their military successes in Flanders, enabled
them to treat on equal terms, and nothing had been taken from Spain.

The war was remarkable for the prominence of privateering on both sides. It
was carried on by the Spaniards in the West Indies with great success, and
actively at home. The French were no less active in all seas. Mahe de la
Bourdonnais's attack on Madras partook largely of the nature of a
privateering venture. The British retaliated with vigour. The total number
of captures by French and Spanish corsairs was in all probability larger
than the list of British--partly for the reason given by Voltaire, namely,
that more British merchants were taken because there were many more British
merchant ships to take, but partly also because the British government had
not yet begun to enforce the use of convoy so strictly as it did in later
times.

See Beatson's _Naval and Military Memoirs_ (London, 1804); _La Marine
militaire de la France sous le regne de Louis XV_, by G. Lacour-Gayet
(Paris, 1902); _The Royal Navy_, by Sir W. L. Clowes and others (London,
1891, &c.).

(D. H.)

AUTHENTI