trongly protested against the nomination, as soon as he was informed of
it. Out of this dispute arose the ignoble fall of the Goderich
administration, though it was preceded by more serious dissensions on
foreign policy. The king, whose activity revived with the increasing
weakness of his ministers, committed himself, without asking their
opinion, to a hearty approval of Codrington's action at Navarino, in
which, as will be recorded hereafter, that admiral had co-operated in
the destruction of the Turkish navy, though the British government
professed to be at peace with the Porte. The king was also adverse to a
proposal for the admission of Holland and Wellesley into the cabinet.
Goderich in consequence resigned, but had withdrawn his resignation when
the quarrel between Huskisson and Herries broke out afresh. Driven to
distraction by difficulties to which he was utterly unequal, Goderich
once more abandoned his post. The king gladly dispensed with his
services, and after some negotiation with Harrowby sent for Wellington
on January 9, 1828, giving him a free hand to invite any co-operation
except that of Grey. It was stipulated, however, "that the Roman
Catholic question was not to be made a cabinet question," and that both
the lord chancellors, as well as the lord lieutenant of Ireland, were to
be "protestants".[83]

[Pageheading: _WELLINGTON PRIME MINISTER._]

It must ever be regretted, for the sake of the country not less than of
his own fame, that Wellington undertook the premiership. He was beyond
all dispute the greatest man in England, and exercised up to the end of
his life a more powerful influence in emergencies than any other
subject. But he had judged himself rightly when he declared that he was
wholly unfit to be prime minister, and his administration was among the
weakest of modern times. The firmness which had sustained him in so many
campaigns, the political sagacity which had enabled him to grapple with
the complications of Spanish affairs, and with the great settlement of
Europe, equally failed him in party management and in the estimation of
public opinion at home. He understood better than any man how to deal
with the king, and overbore not only the king's own prejudices but the
machinations of the Duke of Cumberland with masterly resolution. He set
a good example in declining to regard himself as a mere party leader and
in refusing to study the arts of popularity hunting, but he never
grasped the