he other powers, and the
arch-enemy of Islam; and he declared the treaty of Akkerman, by which
the outstanding disputes between Russia and the Porte had been settled
in October, 1826, to have been extorted by force and only signed in
order to save time. This defiance of Russia, if not of all Christendom,
was followed by a levy of Turkish troops and the expulsion of most of
the Christian residents from Constantinople. No course was now open to
Russia but to make war. It remained to be seen whether any other power
would join her. On January 6, 1828, a Russian despatch announced the
tsar's intention of occupying the Danubian principalities, and suggested
that France and Great Britain should force the Dardanelles and thus
compel the Porte to comply with the provisions of the treaty of London.

[Pageheading: _WELLINGTON'S EASTERN POLICY._]

It is possible that if the direction of British foreign policy had
remained in the hands of Goderich and Dudley, our government might have
lent its support to a settlement of the Eastern question which would in
effect have been the work of Russia only. The more daring policy of
Canning, by which Great Britain had attempted to take the lead as
opportunity offered, either in active co-operation with Russia or in
active opposition to her, could only be directed by a more versatile
statesman than the nation now possessed. The accession to office of
Wellington, though it left Dudley at the foreign office, was really
marked by a return to the policy of Castlereagh, a policy which, if not
brilliant, was at least honourable, consistent, and considerate, and
which in the hands of Wellington was managed with a sufficient measure
of firmness, though with less tact and insight than had been shown by
Castlereagh. The first object of this policy was to keep the special
grievances of Russia distinct from the complaints which Europe at large
or, in the present situation, the three allied powers were able to bring
against the Porte. By so doing the British government hoped to prevent
Russia from dragging other powers into a war for her private benefit,
and also to render it impossible for Russia to use her special
grievances as a lever by which she might effect a separate settlement of
the general question. For some years this policy was successful. Russia
did indeed wage a separate war with the Turks, but the Greek question
was settled by the three powers conjointly, and Great Britain rather
than Russia