peers.[105]

[Pageheading: _ATTEMPTS TO FORM A TORY MINISTRY._]

But Wellington knew that he was powerless to manage the house of commons
without the aid of Peel, and Peel, though pliable in the case of
catholic emancipation, was inflexible in the case of reform. He drew a
distinction between these cases, and absolutely rejected the advice of
Croker that he should grasp the helm of state to avert the worse evil of
the whigs being recalled. "I look," he wrote, "beyond the exigency and
the peril of the present moment, and I do believe that one of the
greatest calamities that could befall the country would be the utter
want of confidence in the declarations of public men which must follow
the adoption of the bill of reform by me as a minister of the
crown."[106] This language, repeated under reserve in the house of
commons, after a direct appeal from the king, strongly contrasts with
that of the duke who roundly asserted that he should have been ashamed
to show his face in the streets if he had refused to serve his sovereign
in an emergency. The marked divergence of views and conduct between the
two leaders of the conservative party led to a temporary estrangement
which materially weakened their counsels, and was not finally removed
until a fresh crisis arose two years later.

While Lyndhurst and the duke were vainly endeavouring to patch up a
government without Peel or his personal adherents, Goulburn and Croker,
the house of commons and the country gave decisive proofs of their
resolution. A vote of confidence in Grey's ministry, proposed by
Ebrington, was carried on May 10 by a majority of eighty. Petitions came
in from the city of London and Manchester, calling upon the commons to
stop the supplies, and the reckless populace clamoured for a run upon
the Bank of England. A mass meeting convened by the Birmingham
political union had already hoisted the standard of revolt against the
legislature, unless it would comply with the will of the people; the
example was spreading rapidly, and events seemed to be hurrying on
towards a fulfilment of Russell's prediction that, in the event of a
political deadlock, the British constitution would perish in the
conflict. The duke was credited, of course unjustly, with the intention
of establishing military rule, and doubts were freely expressed whether
he could rely either on the army or on the police to put down insurgent
mobs. The excitement in the house of commons itself was sc