miracle is an event of which the causes
cannot be explained by the natural reason through a reference to
ascertained workings of Nature; but since miracles were wrought
according to the understanding of the masses, who are wholly ignorant of
the workings of Nature, it is certain that the ancients took for a
miracle whatever they could not explain by the method adopted by the
unlearned in such cases, namely, an appeal to the memory, a recalling of
something similar, which is ordinarily regarded without wonder; for most
people think they sufficiently understand a thing when they have ceased
to wonder at it. The ancients, then, and indeed most men up to the
present day, had no other criterion for a miracle; hence we cannot doubt
that many things are narrated in Scripture as miracles of which the
causes could easily be explained by reference to ascertained workings of
Nature. We have hinted as much in Chapter III, in speaking of the sun
standing still in the time of Joshua, and going backwards in the time of
Ahaz; but we shall soon have more to say on the subject when we come to
treat of the interpretation of miracles later on in this chapter.

It is now time to pass on to the second point, and show that we cannot
gain an understanding of God's essence, existence, or providence by
means of miracles, but that these truths are much better perceived
through the fixed and immutable order of Nature.

I thus proceed with the demonstration. As God's existence is not
self-evident, it must necessarily be inferred from ideas so firmly and
incontrovertibly true that no power can be postulated or conceived
sufficient to impugn them. They ought certainly so to appear to us when
we infer from them God's existence, if we wish to place our conclusion
beyond the reach of doubt; for if we could conceive that such ideas
could be impugned by any power whatsoever, we should doubt of their
truth, we should doubt of our conclusion, namely, of God's existence,
and should never be able to be certain of anything. Further, we know
that nothing either agrees with or is contrary to Nature, unless it
agrees with or is contrary to these primary ideas; wherefore if we would
conceive that anything could be done in Nature by any power whatsoever
which would be contrary to the laws of Nature, it would also be
contrary to our primary ideas, and we should have either to reject it as
absurd, or else to cast doubt (as just shown) on our primary ideas, and
cons