ties of expression. I
have no god until I address him. This will be the most direct evidence
of what is at least from my point of view a social relation. There can
be no general definition of the form which this address will take. There
may be as many special languages, as many attitudes, and as much
playfulness and subtlety of symbolism as in human intercourse. But, on
the other hand, there are certain utterances that are peculiarly
appropriate to religion. In so far as he regards his object as endowed
with both power and goodness the worshipper will use the language of
adoration; and the sense of his dependence will speak in terms of
consecration and thanksgiving.

"O God, thou art my God; early will I seek thee:
My soul thirsteth for thee, my flesh longeth for thee,
In a dry and weary land, where no water is.
So have I looked upon thee in the sanctuary,
To see thy power and thy glory.
For thy loving-kindness is better than life;
My lips shall praise thee."

These are expressions of a hopeful faith; but, on the other hand, God
may be addressed in terms of hatred and distrust.

"Who is most wretched in this dolorous place?
I think myself; yet I would rather be
My miserable self than He, than He
Who formed such creatures to his own disgrace.

"The vilest thing must be less vile than Thou
From whom it had its being, God and Lord!
Creator of all woe and sin! abhorred,
Malignant and implacable."[104:13]

In either case there may be an indefinite degree of hyperbole. The
language of love and hate, of confidence and despair, is not the
language of description. In this train of the religious consciousness
there is occasion for whatever eloquence man can feel, and whatever
rhetorical luxuriance he can utter.

[Sidenote: The Relation between Imagination and Truth in Religion.]

Sect. 37. Such considerations as these serve to account for the exercise
and certain of the fruits of the religious imagination, and to designate
the general criterion governing its propriety. But _how is one to
determine the boundary between the imaginative and the cognitive_? It is
commonly agreed that what religion says and does is not all intended
literally. But when is expression of religion only poetry and eloquence,
and when is it matter of conviction? If we revert again to the cognitive
aspect of religion, it is evident that there is but one test to