rture for a series of inferences.
The greater part of the famous Aristotelian logic consists in a study of
_inference_, or _the derivation of new knowledge from old knowledge_.
Aristotle sought to set down and classify every method of advancing from
premises. The most important form of inference which he defined was the
_syllogism_, a scheme of reasoning to a conclusion by means of two
premises having one term in common. From the premises "all men are
mortal" and "Socrates is a man," one may conclude that "Socrates is
mortal." This is an instance not only of the syllogism in general, but
of its most important "mood," the subsumption of a particular case under
a general rule. Since the decline of Aristotle's influence in philosophy
there has been a notable decrease of interest in the different forms of
inference; though its fundamental importance as the very bone and sinew
of _reasoning_ or _deductive thinking_ has never been challenged. Its
loss of pre-eminence is in part due to the growth of empiricism,
stimulated by the writings of Lord Bacon in the seventeenth century, and
fostered by the subsequent development of experimental science.
_Observation_ is the fundamental logical principle of empiricism. For a
radical empiricism, knowledge would consist of descriptive
generalizations based upon the summation of instances. That branch of
logic which deals with _the advance from individual instances to general
principles_, is called _inductive logic_. It has resulted in the
announcement of canons of accuracy and freedom from preconception, and
in the methodological study of hypothesis, experiment, and verification.
Rules for observation directed to the end of discovering causes,
constitute the most famous part of the epoch-making logic of J. S.
Mills.[187:7]
[Sidenote: Present Tendencies. Theory of the Judgment.]
Sect. 77. There are two significant tendencies in contemporary logic.
_Theories of the judgment_ have arisen in the course of an attempt to
define the least complexity that must be present in order that thought
shall come within the range of truth and error. It is evident that no
one either knows or is in error until he takes some attitude which lays
claim to knowledge. Denoting by the term _judgment_ this minimum of
complexity in knowledge, an important question arises as to the sense in
which the judgment involves the subject, predicate, and copula that are
commonly present in its propositional form.
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