things; since you made it to consist in
an absolute existence exterior to the mind. That is to say,
you are a downright sceptic. So I have gained my point, which
was to show your principles led to Scepticism."[278:10]

[Sidenote: The Refutation of a Conceived Corporeal World.]

Sect. 131. Having advanced the direct empiricist argument for
phenomenalism, Berkeley now gives the rationalistic motive an
opportunity to express itself in the queries of Hylas as to whether
there be not an "absolute extension," somehow abstracted by thought from
the relativities of perception. Is there not at least a _conceivable_
world independent of perception?

The answers of Philonous throw much light upon the Berkeleyan position.
He admits that thought is capable of separating the primary from the
secondary qualities in certain _operations_, but at the same time denies
that this is forming an idea of them as separate.

"I acknowledge, Hylas, it is not difficult to form general
propositions and reasonings about those qualities, without
mentioning any other; and, in this sense, to consider or treat
of them abstractedly. But, how doth it follow that, because I
can pronounce the word _motion_ by itself, I can form the idea
of it in my mind exclusive of body? or, because theorems may
be made of extension and figures, without any mention of
_great_ or _small_, or any other sensible mode or quality,
that therefore it is possible such an abstract idea of
extension, without any particular size or figure, or sensible
quality, should be distinctly formed, and apprehended by the
mind? Mathematicians treat of quantity, without regarding what
other sensible qualities it is attended with, as being
altogether indifferent to their demonstrations. But, when
laying aside the words, they contemplate the bare ideas, I
believe you will find, they are not the pure abstracted ideas
of extension."[279:11]

Berkeley denies that we have ideas of pure extension or motion, because,
although we do actually _deal_ with these and find them intelligible, we
can never obtain a state of mind in which they appear as the content. He
applies this psychological test because of his adherence to the general
empirical postulate that knowledge is limited to the individual content
of its own individual states. "It is a universally received maxim," he
says, "that _everything whic