hod and differentiation of problems. The
earliest and most profound opposition of doctrine in ethics arose from
the differences of interpretation of which the teaching of Socrates is
capable. His doctrine is, as we have seen, verbally expressed in the
proposition, _virtue is knowledge_. Socrates was primarily concerned to
show that there is no real living without an understanding of the
significance of life. To live well is to know the end of life, the good
of it all, and to govern action with reference to that end. Virtue is
therefore the practical wisdom that enables one to live consistently
with his real intention. But what is the real intention, the end or good
of life? In the "Protagoras," where Plato represents Socrates as
expounding his position, virtue is interpreted to mean prudence, or
foresight of pleasurable and painful consequences. He who knows,
possesses all virtue in that he is qualified to adapt himself to the
real situation and to gain the end of pleasure. All men, indeed, seek
pleasure, but only virtuous men seek it wisely and well.

"And do you, Protagoras, like the rest of the world, call some
pleasant things evil and some painful things good?--for I am
rather disposed to say that things are good in as far as they
are pleasant, if they have no consequences of another sort,
and in as far as they are painful they are bad."[192:9]

According to this view painful things are good only when they lead
eventually to pleasure, and pleasant things evil only when their painful
consequences outweigh their pleasantness. Hence moral differences reduce
to differences of skill in the universal quest for pleasure, and
_sensible gratification is the ultimate standard of moral value_. This
ancient doctrine, known as _hedonism_, expressing as it does a part of
life that will not suffer itself for long to be denied, is one of the
great perennial tendencies of ethical thought. In the course of many
centuries it has passed through a number of phases, varying its
conception of pleasure from the tranquillity of the wise man to the
sensuous titillations of the sybarite, and from the individualism of the
latter to the universalism of the humanitarian. But in every case it
shows a respect for the natural man, praising morality for its
disciplinary and instrumental value in the service of such human wants
as are the outgrowth of the animal instinct of self-preservation.

[Sidenote: Rationalism.]

Se