s not pretend to be a _complete_ view of
the world; it simply claims that it is working toward such a
complete view in the future. The highest philosophy of the
scientific investigator is precisely this _toleration_ of an
incomplete conception of the world and the preference for it,
rather than an apparently perfect, but inadequate
conception."[120:1]

It is apparent that if one were to challenge such a statement, the issue
raised would at once be philosophical and not scientific. The problem
here stated and answered, requires for its solution the widest
inclusiveness of view, and a peculiar interest in critical reflection
and logical coordination.

[Sidenote: The Procedure of a Philosophy of Science.]

Sect. 41. One may be prepared for a knowledge of the economic and social
significance of the railway even if one does not know a throttle from a
piston-rod, provided one has broad and well-balanced knowledge of the
interplay of human social interests. One's proficiency here requires one
to stand off from society, and to obtain a perspective that shall be as
little distorted as possible. The reflection of the philosopher of
science requires a similar quality of perspective. All knowledges,
together with the knowing of them, must be his object yonder, standing
apart in its wholeness and symmetry. Philosophy is the least dogmatic,
the most empirical, of all disciplines, since it is the only
investigation that can permit itself to be forgetful of nothing.

But the most comprehensive view may be the most distorted and false. The
true order of knowledge is the difficult task of logical analysis,
requiring as its chief essential some determination of the scope of the
working conceptions of the different independent branches of knowledge.
In the case of natural science this would mean an examination of the
method and results characteristic of this field, for the sake of
defining the kind of truth which attaches to the laws which are being
gradually formulated. But one must immediately reach either the one or
the other of two very general conclusions. If the laws of natural
science cover all possible knowledge of reality, then there is left to
philosophy only the logical function of justifying this statement. Logic
and natural science will then constitute the sum of knowledge. If, on
the other hand, it be found that the aim of natural science is such as
to exclude certain aspects of reality, then