he Son of
the whole Trinity, as we are.
Reply Obj. 3: As stated above (A. 1, ad 2), adoptive sonship is a
certain likeness of the eternal Sonship: just as all that takes place
in time is a certain likeness of what has been from eternity. Now man
is likened to the splendor of the Eternal Son by reason of the light
of grace which is attributed to the Holy Ghost. Therefore adoption,
though common to the whole Trinity, is appropriated to the Father as
its author; to the Son, as its exemplar; to the Holy Ghost, as
imprinting on us the likeness of this exemplar.
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THIRD ARTICLE [III, Q. 23, Art. 3]
Whether It Is Proper to the Rational Nature to Be Adopted?
Objection 1: It would seem that it is not proper to the rational
nature to be adopted. For God is not said to be the Father of the
rational creature, save by adoption. But God is called the Father
even of the irrational creature, according to Job 38:28: "Who is
father of the rain? Or who begot the drops of dew?" Therefore it is
not proper to the rational creature to be adopted.
Obj. 2: Further, by reason of adoption some are called sons of God.
But to be sons of God seems to be properly attributed by the
Scriptures to the angels; according to Job 1:6: "On a certain day
when the sons of God came to stand before the Lord." Therefore it is
not proper to the rational creature to be adopted.
Obj. 3: Further, whatever is proper to a nature, belongs to all that
have that nature: just as risibility belongs to all men. But to be
adopted does not belong to every rational nature. Therefore it is not
proper to human nature.
_On the contrary,_ Adopted sons are the "heirs of God," as is stated
Rom. 8:17. But such an inheritance belongs to none but the rational
nature. Therefore it is proper to the rational nature to be adopted.
_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 2, ad 3), the sonship of
adoption is a certain likeness of natural sonship. Now the Son of God
proceeds naturally from the Father as the Intellectual Word, in
oneness of nature with the Father. To this Word, therefore, something
may be likened in three ways. First, on the part of the form but not
on the part of its intelligibility: thus the form of a house already
built is like the mental word of the builder in its specific form,
but not in intelligibility, because the material form of a house is
not intelligible, as it was in the mind of the builder. In this way
every creature is like t
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