en
(John 5:23): "That all may honor the Son, as they honor the Father."
But Christ's humanity is not common to Him and the Father. Therefore
Christ's humanity and Godhead are not to be adored with the same
adoration.

Obj. 2: Further, honor is properly "the reward of virtue," as the
Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3). But virtue merits its reward by
action. Since, therefore, in Christ the action of the Divine Nature
is distinct from that of the human nature, as stated above (Q. 19, A.
1), it seems that Christ's humanity is to be adored with a different
adoration from that which is given to His Godhead.

Obj. 3: Further, if the soul of Christ were not united to the Word,
it would have been worthy of veneration on account of the excellence
of its wisdom and grace. But by being united to the Word it lost
nothing of its worthiness. Therefore His human nature should receive
a certain veneration proper thereto, besides the veneration which is
given to His Godhead.

_On the contrary,_ We read in the chapters of the Fifth Council
[*Second Council of Constantinople, coll. viii, can. 9]: "If anyone
say that Christ is adored in two natures, so as to introduce two
distinct adorations, and does not adore God the Word made flesh with
the one and the same adoration as His flesh, as the Church has handed
down from the beginning; let such a one be anathema."

_I answer that,_ We may consider two things in a person to whom honor
is given: the person himself, and the cause of his being honored. Now
properly speaking honor is given to a subsistent thing in its
entirety: for we do not speak of honoring a man's hand, but the man
himself. And if at any time it happen that we speak of honoring a
man's hand or foot, it is not by reason of these members being
honored of themselves: but by reason of the whole being honored in
them. In this way a man may be honored even in something external;
for instance in his vesture, his image, or his messenger.

The cause of honor is that by reason of which the person honored has
a certain excellence, for honor is reverence given to something on
account of its excellence, as stated in the Second Part (II-II, Q.
103, A. 1). If therefore in one man there are several causes of
honor, for instance, rank, knowledge, and virtue, the honor given to
him will be one in respect of the person honored, but several in
respect of the causes of honor: for it is the man that is honored,
both on account of knowledge and b