God Christ professes of Himself. The first
(Matt. 19:17): "Why askest thou Me concerning good? One is good,
God." And on this Jerome remarks: "He who had called Him a good
master, and had not confessed Him to be God or the Son of God, learns
that no man, however holy, is good in comparison with God." And
hereby He gave us to understand that He Himself, in His human nature,
did not attain to the height of Divine goodness. And because "in such
things as are great, but not in bulk, to be great is the same as to
be good," as Augustine says (De Trin. vi, 8), for this reason the
Father is said to be greater than Christ in His human nature. The
second subjection is attributed to Christ, inasmuch as all that
befell Christ is believed to have happened by Divine appointment;
hence Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. iv) that Christ "is subject to the
ordinance of God the Father." And this is the subjection of
subservience, whereby "every creature serves God" (Judith 16:17),
being subject to His ordinance, according to Wis. 16:24: "The
creature serving Thee the Creator." And in this way the Son of God
(Phil. 2:7) is said to have taken "the form of a servant." The third
subjection He attributes to Himself, saying (John 8:29): "I do always
the things that please Him." And this is the subjection to the
Father, of obedience unto death. Hence it is written (Phil. 2:8) that
he became "obedient" to the Father "unto death."

Reply Obj. 1: As we are not to understand that Christ is a creature
simply, but only in His human nature, whether this qualification be
added or not, as stated above (Q. 16, A. 8), so also we are to
understand that Christ is subject to the Father not simply but in His
human nature, even if this qualification be not added; and yet it is
better to add this qualification in order to avoid the error of
Arius, who held the Son to be less than the Father.

Reply Obj. 2: The relation of subservience and dominion is based upon
action and passion, inasmuch as it belongs to a servant to be moved
by the will of his master. Now to act is not attributed to the nature
as agent, but to the person, since "acts belong to supposita and to
singulars," according to the Philosopher (Metaph. i, 1). Nevertheless
action is attributed to the nature as to that whereby the person or
hypostasis acts. Hence, although the nature is not properly said to
rule or serve, yet every hypostasis or person may be properly said to
be ruling or serving in this or