sence or
form of the knower, since it may be had by assimilation of the knower
to the thing known by the aid of received species. But this reason
seems not to suffice, because even as we may understand by a likeness
obtained from another, so also may we act by a form obtained from
another, as water or iron heats, by heat borrowed from fire. Hence
there would be no reason why the soul of Christ, as it can know all
things by the similitudes of all things impressed upon it by God,
cannot do these things by the same similitudes.
It has, therefore, to be further considered that what is received in
the lower nature from the higher is possessed in an inferior manner;
for heat is not received by water in the perfection and strength it
had in fire. Therefore, since the soul of Christ is of an inferior
nature to the Divine Nature, the similitudes of things are not
received in the soul of Christ in the perfection and strength they
had in the Divine Nature. And hence it is that the knowledge of
Christ's soul is inferior to Divine knowledge as regards the manner
of knowing, for God knows (things) more perfectly than the soul of
Christ; and also as regards the number of things known, since the
soul of Christ does not know all that God can do, and these God knows
by the knowledge of simple intelligence; although it knows all things
present, past, and future, which God knows by the knowledge of
vision. So, too, the similitudes of things infused into Christ's soul
do not equal the Divine power in acting, i.e. so as to do all that
God can do, or to do in the same manner as God does, Who acts with an
infinite might whereof the creature is not capable. Now there is no
thing, to know which in some way an infinite power is needed,
although a certain kind of knowledge belongs to an infinite power;
yet there are things which can be done only by an infinite power, as
creation and the like, as is plain from what has been said in the
First Part (Q. 45). Hence Christ's soul which, being a creature, is
finite in might, can know, indeed, all things, but not in every way;
yet it cannot do all things, which pertains to the nature of
omnipotence; and, amongst other things, it is clear it cannot create
itself.
Reply Obj. 3: Christ's soul has practical and speculative knowledge;
yet it is not necessary that it should have practical knowledge of
those things of which it has speculative knowledge. Because for
speculative knowledge a mere conformity or
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