table.
Therefore what belongs to the human nature cannot be said of God.

Obj. 2: Further, to attribute to God what is defective seems to be
derogatory to the Divine honor, and to be a blasphemy. Now what
pertains to the human nature contains a kind of defect, as to suffer,
to die, and the like. Hence it seems that what pertains to the human
nature can nowise be said of God.

Obj. 3: Further, to be assumed pertains to the human nature; yet it
does not pertain to God. Therefore what belongs to the human nature
cannot be said of God.

_On the contrary,_ Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 4) that "God
assumed the idioms," i.e. the properties, "of flesh, since God is
said to be passible, and the God of glory was crucified."

_I answer that,_ On this question there was a difference of opinion
between Nestorians and Catholics. The Nestorians wished to divide
words predicated of Christ, in this way, viz. that such as pertained
to human nature should not be predicated of God, and that such as
pertained to the Divine Nature should not be predicated of the Man.
Hence Nestorius said: "If anyone attempt to attribute sufferings to
the Word, let him be anathema" [*Council of Ephesus, Part I, ch. 29].
But if there are any words applicable to both natures, of them they
predicated what pertained to both natures, as "Christ" or "Lord."
Hence they granted that Christ was born of a Virgin, and that He was
from eternity; but they did not say that God was born of a virgin, or
that the Man was from eternity. Catholics on the other hand
maintained that words which are said of Christ either in His Divine
or in His human nature may be said either of God or of man. Hence
Cyril says [*Council of Ephesus, Part I, ch. 26]: "If anyone ascribes
to two persons or substances," i.e. hypostases, "such words as are in
the evangelical and apostolic Scriptures, or have been said of Christ
by the Saints, or by Himself of Himself, and believes that some are
to be applied to the Man, and apportions some to the Word alone--let
him be anathema." And the reason of this is that, since there is one
hypostasis of both natures, the same hypostasis is signified by the
name of either nature. Thus whether we say "man" or "God," the
hypostasis of Divine and human nature is signified. And hence, of the
Man may be said what belongs to the Divine Nature, as of a hypostasis
of the Divine Nature; and of God may be said what belongs to the
human nature, as of a hypostasis