's body and soul were not united, could not say that God
is true man, but that He is figuratively called man by reason of the
parts. Now both these opinions were disproved above (Q. 2, A. 5; Q.
5, A. 1).
Some, on the contrary, hold the reality on the part of man, but deny
the reality on the part of God. For they say that Christ, Who is God
and man, is God not naturally, but by participation, i.e. by grace;
even as all other holy men are called gods--Christ being more
excellently so than the rest, on account of His more abundant grace.
And thus, when it is said that "God is man," God does not stand for
the true and natural God. And this is the heresy of Photinus, which
was disproved above (Q. 2, AA. 10, 11). But some admit this
proposition, together with the reality of both terms, holding that
Christ is true God and true man; yet they do not preserve the truth
of the predication. For they say that man is predicated of God by
reason of a certain conjunction either of dignity, or of authority,
or of affection or indwelling. It was thus that Nestorius held God to
be man--nothing further being meant than that God is joined to man by
such a conjunction that man is dwelt in by God, and united to Him in
affection, and in a share of the Divine authority and honor. And into
the same error fall those who suppose two supposita or hypostases in
Christ, since it is impossible to understand how, of two things
distinct in suppositum or hypostasis, one can be properly predicated
of the other: unless merely by a figurative expression, inasmuch as
they are united in something, as if we were to say that Peter is John
because they are somehow mutually joined together. And these opinions
also were disproved above (Q. 2, AA. 3, 6).
Hence, supposing the truth of the Catholic belief, that the true
Divine Nature is united with true human nature not only in person,
but also in suppositum or hypostasis; we say that this proposition is
true and proper, "God is man"--not only by the truth of its terms,
i.e. because Christ is true God and true man, but by the truth of the
predication. For a word signifying the common nature in the concrete
may stand for all contained in the common nature, as this word "man"
may stand for any individual man. And thus this word "God," from its
very mode of signification, may stand for the Person of the Son of
God, as was said in the First Part (Q. 39, A. 4). Now of every
suppositum of any nature we may truly and pr
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