to the decision of the commission. The duty of
interpreting this law and of giving a construction to the
Constitution and existing laws is vested in the commission; and I
hold that we have no right or power to control in advance, by our
construction, their sworn judgment as to the matters which they are
to decide. We would defeat the very object of the bill should we
invade the essential power of judgment of this commission and
establish a construction in advance and bind them to it. It would,
in effect, be giving to them a mere mock power to decide by leaving
them nothing to decide.

Mr. President, there are certainly very good reasons why the
concurrent action of both houses should be necessary to reject a
vote. It is that feature of this bill which has my heartiest
concurrence; for I will frankly say that the difficulties which have
oppressed me most in considering this question a year or more ago,
before any method had been devised, arose from my apprehensions of
the continued absorption of undue power over the affairs of the
States; and I here declare that the power and the sole power of
appointing the electors is in the State, and nowhere else. The
power of ascertaining whether the State has executed that power
justly and according to the Constitution and laws is the duty which
is cast upon the two houses of Congress. Now, if, under the guise
or pretext of judging of the regularity of the action of a State or
its electors, the Congress or either house may interpose the will of
its members in opposition to the will of the State, the act will be
one of usurpation and wrong, although I do not see where is the
tribunal to arrest and punish it except the great tribunal of an
honest public opinion. But sir that tribunal, though great, though
in the end certain, is yet ofttimes slow to be awakened to action;
and therefore I rejoice when the two houses agree that neither of
them shall be able to reject the vote of a State which is without
contest arising within that State itself, but that the action of
both shall be necessary to concur in the rejection.

If either house may reject, or by dissenting cause a rejection, then
it is in the power of either house to overthrow the electoral
colleges or the popular vote, and throw the election upon the House
of Representatives. This, it is clear to me, cannot be lawfully done
unless no candidate has received a majority of the votes of all the
electors appointed. The s