hamber; and for this reason. That
subject has been discussed now for a century, ever since the
establishment of the government of the United States, and all great
authorities, American, German, French, Italian, have agreed in this,
that a representative government is impossible without a second
chamber. And it has been, especially of late, maintained by great
political writers in all countries, that the repeated failure of
what is called the French republic is mainly to be ascribed to its
not having a second chamber.

But, gentlemen, however anxious foreign countries have been to enjoy
this advantage, that anxiety has only been equaled by the difficulty
which they have found in fulfilling their object. How is a second
chamber to be constituted? By nominees of the sovereign power?
What influence can be exercised by a chamber of nominees? Are they
to be bound by popular election? In what manner are they to be
elected? If by the same constituency as the popular body, what
claim have they, under such circumstances, to criticize or to
control the decisions of that body? If they are to be elected by a
more select body, qualified by a higher franchise, there immediately
occurs the objection, why should the majority be governed by the
minority? The United States of America were fortunate in finding a
solution of this difficulty; but the United States of America had
elements to deal with which never occurred before, and never
probably will occur again, because they formed their illustrious
Senate from materials that were offered them by the thirty-seven
States. We gentlemen, have the House of Lords, an assembly which
has historically developed and periodically adapted itself to the
wants and necessities of the times.

What, gentlemen, is the first quality which is required in a second
chamber? Without doubt, independence. What is the best foundation of
independence? Without doubt, property. The prime minister of England
has only recently told you, and I believe he spoke quite accurately,
that the average income of the members of the House of Lords is
20,000 pounds per annum. Of course there are some who have more,
and some who have less; but the influence of a public assembly, so far
as property is concerned, depends upon its aggregate property, which,
in the present case, is a revenue of 9,000,000 pounds a year. But,
gentlemen, you must look to the nature of this property. It is
visible property, and therefo