to the others. But
at that time Cuba remained faithful to Spain; and when years afterward
she sought to follow the example of the others, she found that she had
to do so single-handed against the undivided might of the Peninsula.
Another very potent reason was, the strength of the pro-Spanish
sentiment and influence in the island, caused by the flocking thither of
many Spanish loyalists from the Central and South American states and
from Santo Domingo. Here, too, American readers may interpret Cuban
conditions through reference to their own history. At the close of the
American Revolution multitudes of British Loyalists left the United
States and settled in Upper Canada, with the result that that Province
of Ontario became proverbially "more British than Great Britain." We
shall see in our narrative how strong the Spanish loyalist party in Cuba
was, and to what extremes it went in its opposition to Cuban
independence. In that we may perceive simply a repetition of conditions
which prevailed at the close of the American War of Independence. It is
probable, too, that the insular position of Cuba, with her coastal
waters controlled by the Spanish fleet, and her central position, making
her an object of intense international interest and intrigue, also
contributed to the same end. Of course, too, since Cuba and Porto Rico
were her last remaining possessions in the Western World, Spain made
extraordinary efforts to retain them and to prevent the success of any
revolutionary movement.
One other influence must be noted, that of the United States. If at any
time the counsels of that country had been harmonious and united, they
would have had a powerful, perhaps a preponderating, effect upon Cuban
affairs. But as we have intimated, and as we shall more fully see in our
narrative, they were strongly, often violently, divided. Some were for
intervention, some were for non-intervention; some were for making Cuba
a free country, some were for preserving it as a slaveholding land; some
were for aiding it to become independent, some were for annexing it to
the United States. There was no unity of policy, and therefore there was
no assurance as to what the United States would do in any given
emergency. Cubans did not know what they could depend upon. If they
revolted, America might help them, and she might not. There can be no
question that this uncertainty was a potent factor in restraining Cubans
from radical action, and that it mat
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