ly, most easily and most surely, it was to
be accepted as the best solution of the problem. Of course, too, the
annexation sentiment in Cuba was greatly encouraged and promoted by the
advocates of annexation in the United States, who were numerous, and
aggressive, and actuated by a variety of motives.

For three fundamental reasons, however, annexation would have been a
deplorable mistake, for both parties. One was, that the Cuban people at
heart wanted independence and would permanently have been satisfied with
nothing less. Every other Spanish colony in the Western Hemisphere had
attained independent sovereignty, and it would have been a reproach to
Cuba to have been satisfied with any less status than theirs. The second
reason was that Cuba and the United States were incompatible in
temperament, and could not have got on well together. That is to be said
without the slightest reflection upon either. The two countries were of
different racial stocks, different languages, different traditions,
different civic ideals. It was and is possible for them to be the best
of friends and neighbors, but that is quite different from being
yoke-fellows.

The third reason was, that Cuba would not have thought of annexation
without Statehood in the Federal Union, to which the United States would
not or at any rate should not have admitted her. Nor is that any
reflection upon Cuba. The principle was established by governmental
utterances, nearly half a century before Cuban independence was
achieved, and indeed before any important efforts were made by the
United States to purchase Cuba, that outlying territories not contiguous
with the continental Union of States, were not to be considered as
fitting candidates for statehood. Had Cuba been acquired by the United
States at any time it is certain that her admission as a State would
have been vigorously opposed on that historic ground. The sequel would
have been either that Cuba would have been excluded from the Union, to
her entire and intense dissatisfaction, or the United States would have
abandoned a highly desirable policy and would have established a
precedent under which grave abuses might thereafter have occurred.

The redemption of Cuba from Spanish rule was long delayed, for a number
of reasons. One was, obviously, the difficulty of achieving it alone.
The South and Central American provinces had revolted simultaneously, or
in rapid succession, so that each was of assistance