anister. When finally, after climbing
over hills, logs, and fallen trees, and forcing the ravines filled
with tangled brush and branches, Weitzel had driven the Confederates
into their works, he held the ridge about two hundred yards distant
from the position to be attacked.

Paine's position at this time was to the right and rear of battery
No. 6, as shown on the map; Weitzel and Dwight were on the same
crest near batteries 3, 4, and 5. The pioneers worked like beavers
to open the roads as fast as the infantry advanced, and with such
skill and zeal that hardly had the infantry formed upon the crest
than the guns of Duryea, Bainbridge, Nims, Haley, and Carruth
unlimbered and opened fire by their side.

At length Thomas succeeded in making his way across the rivulet
known as Little Sandy Creek, and, working gradually forward, began
to fortify with logs the hill on the right, afterward known as Fort
Babcock, in honor of the Lieutenant-Colonel of the 75th New York.

To support Weitzel's movement, Grover sent the 159th New York,
Lieutenant-Colonel Burt, and the 25th Connecticut by a wide detour
to the right to make their way in on Paine's left. Taking advantage
of the protection afforded by the ravine, at the bottom of which
ran or rather trickled Sandy Creek, these regiments, after the most
difficult and exhausting scramble through the brush and over the
fallen timber, came to the base of a steep bluff, near the position
afterward occupied by siege battery No. 6. This, although the works
directly opposite were as yet light, was naturally one of the
ugliest approaches on the whole front. In spite of every exertion,
it took the 159th an hour to move half a mile. Just before reaching
the foot of the hill over which they were to charge, they captured
a Confederate captain and six skirmishers, who lay concealed in
the ravine, cut off by the advance and unable to retire. So crooked
and obscure was the path and so difficult was it to see any thing,
even a few feet ahead, that the officers had to stand at every
little turning to tell the men which way to go. At last the regiment
formed, and, with a rush, began the assault of the bluff, but they
could get no farther than the crest, where they were met by a
destructive flank fire from the Confederate riflemen. There, within
thirty yards of the works, the men sought shelter.

To try the effect of a diversion, Grover put in the 12th Maine,
supported by the remaining frag