an a furious cannonade. At first the Confederate guns replied
with spirit, but it soon became apparent that they were overweighted,
and, moreover, the necessity of husbanding their scanty store of
ammunition no doubt impressed itself upon the minds of the Confederate
commanders.

About six o'clock, when Weitzel judged that the movement on the
left must be well advanced, he put his columns in motion through
the dense forest in his front, forming his command, as far as the
nature of the ground admitted, in column of brigades, Dwight's
brigade under Van Zandt leading, followed by Weitzel's brigade
under Thomas. Paine formed his division in two lines in support,
his own brigade under Fearing in front, and Gooding's in reserve.
The Confederate skirmishers and outposts continued to occupy the
forest and the ravines on this part of their front, and the first
hour was spent in pressing them back behind their entrenchments.
Then Thomas moved forward through Van Zandt's intervals, and
deploying from right to left the 160th New York, Lieutenant-Colonel
Van Petter; 8th Vermont, Lieutenant-Colonel Dillingham; 12th
Connecticut, Lieutenant-Colonel Peck; and 75th New York,
Lieutenant-Colonel Babcock, advanced to the attack. Van Zandt,
owing to the inequalities of the ground and the difficulty of
finding the way, drifted somewhat toward the right. Thereupon
Paine, finding his front uncovered, moved forward into the
interval. Then began what has been aptly termed a "huge bushwack."

Until within three days a part of the Confederate lines in front
of Weitzel had not been fortified at all, the defence resting on
the great natural difficulties of the approaches no less than of
the ground to be held; but in the interval Gardner had taken notice
of the indications that pointed to an advance in this quarter, and
had caused light breastworks to be constructed in all haste. This
the great trees that covered the hill rendered an easy task. On
the morning of the 27th of May, therefore, the works that Weitzel
was called upon to attack consisted mainly of big logs on the crest
and following the contour of the hill, rendered almost unapproachable
by the felled timber that choked the ravines. Thus, while Weitzel's
men could not even see their enemy, they were themselves unable to
move beyond the cover of the hollows and the timber without offering
an easy mark for a destructive fire of small-arms, as well as of
grape, shell, shrapnel, and c