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what might be expected farther on, and this was confusing and difficult to the last degree. Weitzel had, therefore, strong reason for believing that his difficulties, instead of ending with the capture of the Confederate works, might be only beginning. There was, of course, the chance that the garrison along the whole front might throw down their arms or abandon their defences the moment they should find themselves taken in reverse at any point, for it was known that they had no reserves to be reckoned with after breaking through the line. Grover had been ordered to support either the right or the left, or to attempt to make his way into the works, as circumstances might suggest. This last he had tried, and failed to accomplish. On his left there was no attack to support. When riding toward the right he met Weitzel, who, although commanding the right wing, was his junior in rank as well as in experience, Grover gave Weitzel the counsel of prudence, and Weitzel fell in with these views. The two commanders decided to ask fresh orders or to wait for an assault on the centre or left before renewing the attack on the right. All this time Augur stood ready, his division formed and all in perfect order, waiting for the word from Banks, who made his headquarters close at hand, and who, in his turn, waited for the sound of Sherman's musketry as the signal to put in Augur. With Sherman, Augur was in connection along the front, although not in easy communication. The precise nature of the causes that held Sherman back it is, even now, impossible to state, nor would it be easy, in the absence of the facts, to form a conjecture that should seem to be altogether probable and at the same time reasonable. The most plausible surmise seems to be that Sherman supposed he was to wait for the engineers to indicate the point of attack, and that he himself did not choose to go beyond what he conceived to be his orders to precipitate a movement whose propriety he doubted. Sherman was an officer of the old army, of wide experience, favorably known and highly esteemed throughout the service for his intelligence, his character, and his courage. He was known as one of the most distinguished of the chosen commanders of the few light batteries that the government of the United States had thought itself able to afford in the days before the war. Before coming to Louisiana he had commanded a department, and in that capacity had carried to
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