an operation would have ceased to exist. What led Banks
to this despondent view was the fact that he had been counting upon
Grant's steamboat transportation for the crossing of the Mississippi
to Bayou Sara, and at first, he did not see how this deficiency
could now be met.

Indeed, on the 12th of May, he went so far as to issue his preparatory
orders for the retrograde movement; but the next day careful
reconnoissances by his engineers, Major Houston and Lieutenant
Harwood, led him to change his mind and to conclude that it would,
after all, be possible to march to Simmesport, and there, using
the light-draught boats of the Department of the Gulf, supplemented
by such steamers as Grant might be able to spare for this purpose,
to transfer the whole column to Grand Gulf and thence march to join
Grant in the rear of Vicksburg. Accordingly, on the 13th of May,
Banks gave orders for the immediate movement of his whole force in
accordance with this plan, and set aside all the preparations that
had previously been made.

When the news reached Washington that Grant had gone to Jackson
and Banks to Alexandria, great was the dissatisfaction of the
Government and emphatic its expression. On the 19th of May Halleck
wrote to Banks:

"These operations are too eccentric to be pursued. I must again
urge that you co-operate as soon as possible with General Grant
east of the Mississippi. Your forces must be united at the earliest
possible moment. Otherwise the enemy will concentrate on Grant
and crush him. Do all you can to prevent this. . . .

"We shall watch with the greatest anxiety the movements of yourself
and General Grant. I have urged him to keep his forces concentrated
as much as possible and not to move east until he gets control of
the Mississippi River."

And again, on the 23d of May, still more pointedly:

"If these eccentric movements, with the main forces of the enemy
on the Mississippi River, do not lead to some serious disaster, it
will be because the enemy does not take full advantage of his
opportunity. I assure you the Government is exceedingly disappointed
that you and General Grant are not acting in conjunction. It
thought to secure that object by authorizing you to assume the
entire command as soon as you and General Grant could unite."

When the despatches were penned, Grant and Banks were already
committed to their own plans for the final campaign on the Mississippi.
When they were received,