ht, the six regiments that remained of Paine's division
after the heavy detachments, and the two colored regiments under
Nelson. During the day of the 25th Weitzel gained the wooded slope
covering the Confederate left front. The Confederate advanced
guard on this part of their line, composed in part of the 9th
battalion of Louisiana partisan rangers, under Lieutenant-Colonel
Wingfield, resisted Weitzel's advance stoutly, but was steadily
and without difficulty pushed back into the entrenchments.

When night fell on the 26th of May the division commanders met at
headquarters at Riley's on the Bayou Sara road to consider the
question of an assault. No minutes of this council were kept, and
to this day its conclusions are a matter of dispute. They may
safely be regarded as sufficiently indicated by the orders for the
following day. By at least one of those present any immediate
movement in the nature of an assault was objected to because of
the great distance that still separated the lines of investment
from the Confederate earthworks; it was urged that the troops would
have to move to the attack over ground the precise character of
which was as yet unknown to them or to their commanders, although
it was known to be broken and naturally difficult and to be obstructed
by felled timber. The general opinion was, however, that prompt
and decisive action was demanded in view of the unusual and precarious
nature of the campaigns on which the two armies of Grant and Banks
were now embarked, the uncertainty as to what Johnston might do,
and the certainty that a disaster at Vicksburg would bring ruin in
Louisiana. Moreover, officers and men alike were in high spirits
and full of confidence in themselves, and they outnumbered the
Confederates rather more than two to one. This was the view held
by Banks himself. Upon his mind, moreover, the disapproval and
the repeated urgings of the government acted as a goad. Accordingly,
as soon as the council broke up he gave orders for an assault on
the following morning.

All the artillery was to open upon the Confederate works at daybreak.
For this purpose the reserve artillery was placed under the immediate
orders of Arnold. He was to open fire at six.

Weitzel was to take advantage of the attacks on the left and centre
to force his way into the works on his front, since it was natural
to expect that, whether they should prove successful or not, these
attacks would distract the