13th, Halleck telegraphed Schenck, in answer to an
inquiry, that he had no reliable information as to rebel infantry
being in the Valley, and the same day Schenck wired his chief of
staff at Harper's Ferry to "Instruct General Milroy to use great
caution, risking nothing unnecessarily, and be prepared for falling
back in good order if overmatched."
Milroy advised Schenck of fighting at Winchester on the 13th, and
from General Kelley, on the same day, Schenck learned for the first
time that General Lee was on his way to drive Milroy out of
Winchester. Schenck at once _attempted_ to telegraph Milroy to
"fall back, fighting, if necessary, and to keep the road to Harper's
Ferry."
Halleck wired Schenck on the 14th: "It is reported that Longstreet
and Ewell's corps have passed through Culpeper to Sperryville,
towards the Valley."( 7)
This was the first intimation that came from Halleck or Hooker that
Lee's army contemplated moving in the direction of the Valley, or
that there was any apprehension that it might escape the vigilance
of the Army of the Potomac, supposed to be confronting it or at
least watching its movements. Another dispatch came on the 14th
to General Schenck as follows:
"Get Milroy from Winchester to Harper's Ferry if possible. He will
be 'gobbled up' if he remains, if he is not already past salvation.
"A. Lincoln,
"President United States."
It remains to narrate what did take place at Winchester, and then,
in the full light of the facts, to decided upon whom censure or
credit should fall.
When, on the 14th, Halleck announced that Longstreet and Ewell's
corps "have passed through Culpeper to Sperryville towards the
Valley," we had been fighting Ewell's corps, or parts of it, for
two days at Winchester, three days' march from Culpeper, and other
portions of Lee's army had reached the Valley and Martinsburg.
The report that Winchester was to have been attacked on June 10th
was true, but the advance of the Union cavalry south of the
Rappahannock, and its battle on the 9th at Brandy Station, north
of Culpeper Court House (Lee's then headquarters), so disorganized
the Confederate cavalry as to cause a delay in the movement of
Ewell's corps into the Valley, then proceeding _via_ Front Royal.
On the night of the 12th of June my scouts found it impossible to
advance more than four or five miles on the Front Royal, Strasburg,
and Cedar Creek roads before encountering Confederate cavalry
pi
|