so signally defeated that the Second Corps
remained in possession of the field until 9 P.M., when it pursued
its march unmolested to a junction with the main army. Hill reported
his loss, killed, wounded, and missing, at 1378,( 6) but it was
claimed on good authority to have been much larger. The loss in
the Second Corps at Bristoe is not given separately, but its total
losses in two engagements of the day, including Bristoe, were 546.( 6)
Hill's conduct was criticised, and his report bears, of dates in
November, 1863, the following indorsements:
"General Hill explains how, in his haste to attack the Third Army
Corps of the enemy, he overlooked the presence of the Second, which
was the cause of the disaster that ensued.
"R. E. Lee, General."
"The disaster at Bristoe Station seems due to a gallant but over-
hasty pressing on of the enemy.
"J. A. Seddon, Secretary of War."
"There was a want of vigilance, by reason of which it appears the
Third Army Corps of the enemy got a position, giving great advantage
to them.
"J. D." (Davis) ( 7)
The last two indorsements do not show that Seddon and Davis clearly
comprehended the real situation.
Lee by continued flank movements indicated a purpose to force the
Union Army back into its intrenchments at Alexandria, but this plan
was abandoned after the disaster at Bristoe. Soon the Confederates
commenced falling back towards the Rappahannock, destroying the
railroad track and bridges, and Lee finally put his army into camp
on the Botts plantation, near Brandy Station. He built winter
quarters there, keeping possession of the fords of the Rappahannock,
and strongly fortifying north of the river at Rappahannock Station.
The Union Army commenced a cautious forward movement on the 19th
of October, keeping close to the Orange and Alexandria Railroad.
On the 21st I encamped on the battlefield of Bristoe, and we finished
the burial of the dead. On the 26th, about 9 P.M., an order came
advising me that General John Buford's cavalry division was threatened
and in peril near Catlett's Station, and directing me to go to his
relief. My brigade, with a battery attached, reached him about
midnight, and under his direction formed line of battle, my left
resting on the railroad, the cavalry on the flanks. He had been
attacked at dark by what seemed to be an overwhelming force of
infantry and cavalry, but he had stubbornly held his ground. Buford
was an accomplish
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