e only possible
route then open to us to Harper's Ferry. About 2000 men of all
arms reached Harper's Ferry with us, and others straggled in later.
But much the larger part of Milroy's command escaped with the
animals to Pennsylvania; 2700 soldiers assembled at Bloody Run
alone. The losses in captured, including the sick and wounded left
in hospital, and the wounded left on the field, were about 3000.
The losses in my command, considering the desperate nature of the
fighting, were small, and but few of my officers and soldiers, fit
for duty and not wounded in battle, were captured. Lieutenants T.
J. Weakley and C. M. Gross, through neglect of the officer of the
day, were left on picket near Winchester, with 60 men of the 110th
Ohio, and, consequently captured. The surgeons, with their
assistants, were left at the hospital and on the field in charge
of the sick and wounded. Chaplain McCabe remained to assist in
the care of the wounded left on the battle-field. The enemy's loss
in killed and wounded much exceeded the Union loss on each of the
three days' fighting. I was bruised by a spent ball on the 13th,
and slightly wounded by a musket fired by a soldier not ten feet
from me near the close of the fight at the earthwork on the 14th,
and my horse was shot under me in the night engagement at Stephenson's
Depot. We fought the best of the troops of Lee's army. General
Edward Johnson's division of Ewell's corps, in the night engagement,
consisted of Stewart, Nicholl, and Walker's (Stonewall) brigades.
Johnson was censured for not having reached and covered the
Martinsburg road earlier in the night of the 14th of June. He
reported his command in a critical situation for a time after our
attack upon it; that "two sets of cannoniers (13 out of 16) were
killed or disabled."(16)

The war furnishes no parallel to the fighting at Winchester, and
there is no instance of the war where a comparatively small force,
after being practically surrounded by a greatly superior one, cut
its way out.

Johnson's division was so roughly handled on the morning of the
15th that it did not pursue us, nor was it ordered to march again
until some time the next day. The plan of Lee was for Ewell's
corps to push forward rapidly into Pennsylvania. His delay at
Winchester postponed Lee's giving the order to Ewell "to take
Harrisburg" until June 21st.(17) The loss of three or more days
at Winchester most likely saved Pennsylvania's capital