t and second
days, and over-confident of the fighting qualities of his splendid
army, born of its defeats of the Army of the Potomac on the
Rappahannock, decided to deliver offensive battle, though far from
his natural base. Orders were accordingly given to Longstreet to
mass a column of not less than 15,000 men for an assault, under
cover of artillery, on the Union left centre, to be supported by
simultaneous real or pretended attacks by other portions of the
Confederate Army.

Longstreet did not believe in the success of the attack, and hence
offered many objections to it, and predicted its failure. He
advised swinging the Confederate Army by its right around the Union
left, and thus compel Meade to withdraw from his naturally strong
position.( 9) Lee would not listen to his great Lieutenant.
Pickett's division of three brigades was assigned to the right of
the column, and it became the division of direction. Kemper's
division of four brigades from Hill's corps was formed on the left
of Pickett, and Wilcox's brigade of Hill's corps was placed in
echelon in support on Pickett's right, and the brigades of Scales
and Lane of Hill's corps, under Trimble, were to move in support
of Kemper's left. The whole column of ten brigades, composed of
forty-six regiments, numbered about 20,000 men.

Generals Pendleton and Alexander, chiefs of artillery of the Army
of Northern Virginia and of Longstreet's corps, respectively, massed
150 guns on a ridge extending generally parallel to the left of
the Union Army and about one mile therefrom, and so as to be able
to pour a converging fire on its left centre.(10) While this
preparation for decisive battle went on in the Confederate lines,
the Union Army stood at bay, in readiness for the battle-storm
foreboded by the long lull and the active preparations observed in
its front. At 1 P.M. Longstreet's batteries opened, and the superior
guns of the Union Army, though not in position in such great number,
promptly responded. This terrific duel lasted about two hours.
Meade, recognizing the futility of his artillery fire, and in
anticipation of the assault soon to come, ordered a large portion
of his artillery withdrawn under cover, to give the guns time to
cool and to be resupplied with ammunition. This led the enemy to
believe he had silenced them effectively, and the assaulting column
went forward.(11) The Union artillery, with fresh batteries added,
was again quickly put in