be made, and he felt strong enough to defeat it. He argued
that Lee would not dare to detach any part of his infantry force
from the front of the Army of the Potomac. But in addition to the
reports referred to, I learned as early as the 1st of June, through
correspondence secretly brought within our lines from an officer
of Lee's army to which I gained access, that Lee contemplated a
grand movement North, and that his army would reach Winchester on
June 10, 1863. The Secessionists of Winchester generally believed
we would be attacked on that day. I gave this information to
Milroy, but he still persisted in believing the whole story was
gotten up to cause him to disgracefully abandon the Valley.( 4)

The 10th of June came, and the Confederate Army failed to appear.
This confirmed Milroy in his disbelief in a contemplated attack
with a strong force, and my credulity was ridiculed. As early,
however, as June 8th, Milroy wired Schenck at Baltimore that he
had information that Lee had mounted an infantry division to join
Stuart's cavalry at Culpeper; that the cavalry force there was
"probably more than twice 12,000," and that there was "doubtless
a mighty raid on foot."( 5) Colonel Don Piatt, Schenck's chief of
staff, visited and inspected the post at Winchester on the 10th
and 11th, and when he reached Martinsburg, Va., on his return on
the 11th, he dispatched Milroy to immediately take steps to remove
his command to Harper's Ferry, leaving at Winchester only a lookout
which could readily fall back to Harper's Ferry.( 6) This order
was sent in the light of what Piatt deemed the proper construction
of a dispatch of that date from Halleck to Schenck, and from the
latter to him. Milroy at once wired Schenck of the receipt of the
Piatt dispatch, saying:

"I have sufficient force to hold the place safely, but if any force
is withdrawn the balance will be captured in twenty-four hours.
All should go, or none."

This brought, June 12th, a dispatch from Schenck to Milroy in this
language:

"Lt.-Col. Piatt has . . . misunderstood me, and somewhat exceeded
his instructions. You will make all the required preparations for
withdrawing, but will hold your position in the meantime."

On the 12th Milroy reported skirmishes with Confederate cavalry on
the Front Royal and Strasburg roads, adding:

"I am perfectly certain of my ability to hold this place. Nothing
but cavalry appears yet. Let them come."

As late as the