isers. The Austrian _Red
Book_ gives additional evidence that at the eleventh hour,
and shortly before Germany issued its ultimatum to Russia,
Austria did finally agree to discuss the Servian question
with Russia; but the information, which Germany presumably
gave to its ally of its intention to send the ultimatum
to Russia, is carefully withheld. Notwithstanding this
suppression of vital documents, the diplomatic papers of
Germany and Austria, now _partially_ given to the world,
disclose an unmistakable purpose, amounting to an open
confession, that they intended to force their will upon
Europe, even though this course involved the most stupendous
war in the history of mankind.

March 1, 1915.

CHAPTER IV

GERMANY'S RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE AUSTRIAN ULTIMATUM

On June 28, 1914, the Austrian Crown Prince was murdered at Serajevo.
For nearly a month thereafter there was no public statement by
Austria of its intentions, with the exception of a few semi-inspired
dispatches to the effect that it would act with the greatest
moderation and self-restraint. A careful examination made of the files
of two leading American newspapers, each having a separate news
service, from June 28, 1914, to July 23, 1914, has failed to disclose
a single dispatch from Vienna which gave any intimation as to the
drastic action which Austria was about to take.

The French Premier, Viviani, in his speech to the French Senate, and
House of Deputies, on August 4, 1914, after referring to the fact that
France, Russia, and Great Britain had cooperated in advising Servia to
make any reasonable concession to Austria, added:

This advice was all the more valuable in view of the fact
that Austria-Hungary's demands had been inadequately
foreshadowed to the governments of the Triple Entente, _to
whom during the three preceding weeks the Austro-Hungarian
Government had repeatedly given assurance that its demands
would be extremely moderate_.

The movements of the leading statesmen and rulers of the Triple
Entente clearly show that they, as well as the rest of the world, had
been lulled into false security either by the silence of Austria, or,
as Viviani avers, by its deliberate suggestion that its treatment of
the Serajevo incident would be conciliatory, pacific, and moderate.

Thus, on July 20th, the Russian Ambassador, obviously anticipating n